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ABSTRACT: This article presents empirical information on experiences of corruption in the wastewater sector. 
Previous studies have examined the types and magnitude of corrupt behaviour that have been documented in water 
supply and sanitation services and have found that corruption in the sector is sophisticated and pervasive. Drawing 
on interviews with key stakeholders, we document a range of corrupt behaviours at the citizen–institution interface 
and in public financial management. Our findings underline the importance of contextual factors, including the rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation taking place in the Extended Bangkok Metropolitan Region, as well as the existing 
institutional and regulatory weaknesses. Our findings also point to the environmental impact of corruption in the 
wastewater sector, a hitherto neglected factor which our respondents perceived as an immediate and direct threat 
to their communities and livelihoods. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corruption, the abuse of public power for private gain, threatens the right to clean and safe water for 
billions of people. Previous studies find that it hinders access to safe drinking water and adequate 
sanitation (Anbarci et al., 2009), contributing to millions of preventable illnesses and deaths every year 
(Montgomery and Elimelech, 2007). Several prominent studies have found that corruption is pervasive 
in the water and sanitation sector; this ranges from bribery, to falsification of meter readings, to 
institutionalised corruption at high levels of government (Davis, 2004; Butterworth and De La Harpe, 
2009; Gonzalez de Asis et al., 2009; Tetreault and McCulligh, 2018). In response, the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals 6 and 16 have prioritised access to safe water and the fight against 
corruption. Scholars of water governance have also proposed a series of creative solutions to the 
problem, including greater attention to the study of incentive structures (Araral and Wang, 2013), citizen 
participation (Carr et al., 2012), and innovative technologies (Krolikowski, 2014). 
We contribute to this literature by documenting the political economy of corruption in the wastewater 
sector in the Extended Bangkok Metropolitan Region (EBMR). Our study responds to the concern that 
this sector does not receive the same political attention as drinking water (Smith and Walker, 2019) and, 
more generally, that there is a need for further research on local corruption in urban centres (Zimelis, 
2020). We argue that a study of the EBMR is important to an overall understanding of corruption in 
wastewater as the region is experiencing several interlinked social processes which are emblematic of 
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developing regions across the world. Among the most salient of these processes are rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation, which in recent years have strained the region’s water infrastructure 
to the breaking point. A highly fragmented regulatory structure has compounded the problem, plunging 
the sector into crisis and dysfunction and creating a breeding ground for corruption. Our study sheds light 
on this murky phenomenon, illustrating the political economy of corruption in the sector, as well as its 
broader social and ecological consequences. 
Drawing on interviews with key stakeholders, we document a range of corrupt behaviours in the 
wastewater sector. Our analysis is informed by the classic definition of corruption as the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain. This definition encompasses bribery and undue influence, and both 
grand and petty corruption. In the wastewater sector, these behaviours are typically manifested as the 
paying of bribes to avoid paying fees or to enable illegal dumping; they also include corruption related to 
the construction of wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs). While our analysis is sensitive to the classic 
definition, scholars of corruption argue that it is important to also consider questions of integrity in public 
life (Rose and Heywood, 2013). The lax enforcement of regulations regarding wastewater and pollution, 
for example, is not necessarily corrupt but can pose a significant threat to society. To address this 
concern, our analysis casts a wider net, considering integrity failures in wastewater in addition to 
behaviours that are in accordance with accepted definitions of corruption. 
Our findings corroborate previous studies which expose corrupt behaviours that range from petty 
corruption and favourable treatment to grand corruption that has made national headlines. Our findings 
suggest that rapid development has placed infrastructure under considerable pressure, giving rise to 
corruption as a way to 'get things done'. This factor is further compounded by regulatory fragmentation, 
weak oversight of corruption, deregulation of environmental controls, and perverse incentive structures 
among state agencies. While some of these findings will be familiar to scholars of corruption and water 
governance, our interviews also point to novel effects and consequences, including substantial spillovers 
from the wastewater sector to other economic sectors, and severe environmental and ecological impacts. 
The environmental impact of wastewater – a hitherto neglected factor in the corruption studies literature 
– was perceived by some of our respondents to be an immediate and direct threat to downstream 
communities and their livelihoods. A common thread in our findings is the problem of unequal losses, 
where the impact of corruption is experienced most acutely by vulnerable individuals and communities. 
This is particularly evident in our findings related to smallholder farmers and those located in 
downstream areas. 
This paper is organised as followed. First, we review the literature on corruption in the water and 
sanitation sector. Next, we outline our methods and the context of our investigation, providing an 
overview of corruption in Thailand in general and of the EBMR’s wastewater sector specifically. We then 
present our findings from interviews with key stakeholders, and conclude with a discussion of potential 
ways to control corruption in the sector. 
THE LITERATURE 
The human cost of corruption in the water and sanitation sector is severe, with prominent studies finding 
that it limits access to safe drinking water (Anbarci et al., 2009; Kenny, 2009) and enables the spread of 
waterborne diseases (Duflo et al., 2012). Estimates also suggest that millions, and possibly billions, of 
people are affected. Transparency International (2008) estimates that in a best case scenario as much as 
10 per cent of expenditure on water is lost to corruption, while a worst case scenario suggests a loss of 
as much as 30 per cent. 
There are several reasons why the water and sanitation sector is prone to corruption. First, the sector 
is typically monopolistic in structure, and water infrastructure requires high upfront costs to build and 
maintain (ibid). Second, water governance is often weak and fragmented, with a small number of officials 
having substantial discretionary power over spending decision. Third, regulatory fragmentation is very 
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common, where water management is the responsibility of multiple and sometimes overlapping agencies 
and ministries, which gives rise to conflicts of interest and inefficiencies in service delivery. 
Institutions, actors and incentives feature prominently in most political economy research in the area 
of water and sanitation. Krause (2007, 2010), for example, finds that the level of democracy and the 
robustness of the rule of law is associated with greater access to water and sanitation services and that 
poor quality governance at the subnational level affects the efficiency of providers, which in turn hinders 
access to services. Harris et al., (2011) also emphasise the importance of institutions, actors and 
incentives in their political economy framework. Institutions alone thus do not explain everything that 
we observe in the wastewater sector. A wide range of historical, developmental and distributional issues 
also feature prominently in the literature. Auriol and Blanc (2009), for example, present evidence on 
access to water in sub-Saharan Africa, finding that it is vulnerable to capture by the ruling elite. Gandy 
(2008) points to the historical and postcolonial roots of Mumbai’s dysfunctional water infrastructure, 
arguing that problems that originated in the colonial era have been exacerbated by rapid urban growth, 
authoritarian forms of political mobilisation, and the dominance of middle-class interests. Kjellén (2018) 
shows how the burdens and risks of pollution are displaced onto the poorest or more distant populations, 
and that this process is compounded by economic growth. Taking our lead from these findings, we expect 
that the problem of unequal losses is compounded by corruption in water and sanitation. 
While existing studies shed light on the causes and consequences of corruption in water and 
sanitation, there is still much that we do not know about the scale of the problem. Cross-national data 
on corruption in water and sanitation is patchy and there are significant issues regarding its reliability. 
Most empirical work on corruption uses Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index or 
the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator. Both are based on expert perceptions of corruption 
and there is an ongoing debate about their limitations. Neither take into account the difference between 
grand or petty corruption or tell us where corruption is located in the public sector. Many scholars have 
also criticised them on methodological grounds, arguing that they are vulnerable to the biases of the 
experts who compile the indicators (Svensson, 1999; Reinikka and Svensson, 2006; Fan et al., 2009) and 
are slow to keep up with new developments (Knack, 2007; Kenny, 2009). 
There have been several attempts to address these concerns. The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys 
and other major cross-national surveys like the Afrobarometer have collected microdata on corruption 
in the water sector, surveying businesses and individuals to gather their experiences on corruption and 
access to water services. Unfortunately, the results from these surveys remain underutilised by 
researchers. This leaves many gaps in our understanding of the broad causes and consequences of 
corruption in water and sanitation, including its relationship to other political and cultural institutions 
and practices. 
Davis (2004) gives us the most comprehensive snapshot of corruption in the sector. She documents 
the types and magnitude of corrupt behaviours in water supply and sanitation services in several localities 
in South Asia. Her findings suggest significant evidence of petty corruption, with respondents reporting 
corrupt activities related to falsifying meter readings to produce lower bills and the paying of bribes to 
expedite repair work and new connection applications. The most common type of bribe was that paid to 
have meter readings falsified. 41% of respondents had made more than one payment for this purpose in 
the previous six months. Water and sanitation agencies agreed that it was a common behaviour. 
To understand corruption in the water sector and in areas of public and social life, scholars in 
corruption studies have increasingly turned to experiments and other types of data collection, including 
the gathering of public procurement data. Adam et al. (2020) use this approach to study corruption in 
the water sector in Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay from 2006 to 2018. They estimate 
the financial costs of corruption on contract award prices and the social costs of corruption in stifling 
projects through delays and cancellation. They find significant variation in levels of corruption across 
countries, with substantial prima facie evidence of corruption risk in the water sector. 
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Adam et al. (2020) and Davis (2004) have produced detailed and sophisticated analyses, but gaps 
remain in our understanding of corruption in the water and sanitation sector. In particular, there is a 
need to better understand how societal forces such as rapid growth, industrialisation and urbanisation 
shape the sector. Studying how these processes give rise to corruption can help us to illuminate the 
problem and develop more effective solutions and remedies. There is also a need to address deficits in 
quantitative indicators of corruption. This can be done by studying corruption in contexts such as the 
wastewater sector, which are generally less visible and which receive less political attention than other 
sectors. Finally, there is a more general need for research on local corruption in urban centres. Our 
method and approach are described in the next section. 
METHODS 
Our methods were comprised of two components, a literature review and key informant interviews. The 
literature review included NGO and donor reports, policy documents, academic articles, newspaper 
articles, and online media. From that review, a stakeholder list was created, which was refined as the 
research evolved. Key informant interviews were conducted with the actors mentioned below. The 
interviews took place over the course of approximately five weeks from June to August in both 2019 and 
2020, in the EBMR. In total, 31 stakeholder interviews were conducted with NGO representatives, 
national- and local-level government officials, academics, think tank officials, community leaders, and 
farmers. Using the snowball sampling method, we identified additional stakeholders during our 
interviews, allowing us to connect with a wider community of actors involved in wastewater governance 
in the EBMR. We asked them about the linkages between corruption and poor wastewater treatment, 
the actors involved in corruption, the effects of politics on corruption in the sector, and their suggestions 
of ways to address this problem. Interviewees’ identities were kept confidential given the sensitive nature 
of the topic. Most statements could not be formally substantiated because – as is the very nature of 
corruption – it is hidden and is threatening to whistle-blowers. 
The research area extended substantially beyond the formal urban boundaries of Bangkok to 
encompass the entire mega-urban region. The Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) consists of Bangkok 
and the surrounding five provinces (Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Samut Sakhon, Samut Prakarn and 
Nakhon Pathom); the Extended Bangkok Metropolitan Region (EBMR) is comprised of the BMR plus the 
surrounding provinces of Ayutthaya, Saraburi, Chachoengsao, Chonburi, Rayong, Ratchaburi and 
Phetchaburi (Figure 1). In the past few decades, these areas have rapidly urbanised and industrialised. 
The region’s population grew by over 40% from 1970 to 2010 (Puttanapong, 2018). As of 2017, 55,630 
licensed factories were located in the EBMR; this constituted the majority of the country’s factories 
(Thailand Clean Air Network, 2020) (Figure 2). Much of the wastewater problems arise not only in 
Bangkok; a large proportion is generated in these surrounding provinces. Due to lower land and labour 
costs and more lax regulations, it is in these provinces that many industrial areas and new housing 
developments have come to be located (Parnwell and Wongsuphasawat, 1997). The EBMR contributes 
about half of Thailand’s GDP. 
CORRUPTION IN THAILAND 
Corruption remains rampant and widespread in Thailand. The country’s score on the Corruption 
Perceptions Index has backslid in recent years, coinciding with the military government’s putsch in 2014. 
In September of last year, a representative of the United Nations Development Programme asserted that 
the Thai government has lost up to 100 billion baht due to corruption-related public procurement 
(Bangkok Post, 2019). A 2017 poll by the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce found that extra 
payments ranging from an average of 5 to 15% were given to state officials and politicians when bidding 
on  official government projects  (Khaosod, 2018).  In 2017, Thailand scored only 2.5 out of 7 and ranked 
Water Alternatives – 2021  Volume 14 | Issue 3 
Marks and Breen: Corruption in Bangkok’s wastewater sector 799 
Figure 1. Map of a) Thailand; b) the Extended Bangkok Metropolitan Region; and c) the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region. 
 
Source: Fisher (2021). 
108 out of 140 under a World Bank index on Wastefulness of Government Spending (Watcharothai, 
2018). In a 2002 PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of Thai companies, bribery and corruption adversely 
affected 31% of respondents. Almost one-fifth (18%) of respondents stated that they had been asked for 
a bribe, while the same proportion believed that they had lost an opportunity to a competitor who had 
paid a bribe (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2020). 
The number of corruption-related complaints against local government agencies is much higher than 
against any other agencies. Half of all Thais believe that local governments are corrupt (GAN Integrity, 
2017). Local governments are notorious for their connections to construction companies and many 
scandals have been reported in the media. One reason for the high number of cases is the sheer number 
of local agencies. Another potential explanation is that decentralisation, which began in the 1990s, has 
led to more power and financial resources being placed in the hands of these local bodies (Buchenrieder 
et al., 2017). Still another possible reason for the perceived high levels of corruption in local government 
is that higher levels of government are less transparent and thus corruption is better concealed. Yet 
another explanation is the low wages of local officials, especially in comparison to those in the private 
sector (ibid). Finally, high-ranking officials in many departments are corrupt which, in turn, induces lower-
ranking officials to become "inducted into a subculture of raising unofficial revenues and redistribution 
through the hierarchy of the department" (Phongpaichit et al., 1996: 185). Treerart’s survey (2004) of 
civil servants found that "position buying" was widespread, with lower-ranking officials giving bribes to 
their superiors in the hope of obtaining a promotion. 
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Figure 2. Number of licensed factories by province in 2017. 
 
Source: Thailand Clean Air Network (2020). 
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Scholars have identified a number of reasons for Thailand’s persistent high levels of corruption. Patron – 
client relations form the backbone of Thai society and are a driver of widespread corruption. Patrons 
provide their clients with protection and connections and, in return, the clients are expected to 
reciprocate by providing money or an in-kind payments (Persons, 2016). Patron-client relationships are 
particularly prevalent among three groups in Thailand: politicians, public officials, and businesspeople 
(Tangsupvattana, 2011). Individuals also tend to stay silent to protect their own interests rather than 
expose corrupt practices. Whistle-blowing can be deemed a betrayal and Thais worry that they will 
become isolated and lose their jobs if they do so (Sirisophonphong, 2019). 
Another problem is that Thailand’s National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) has not been very 
effective in curbing corruption, one reason being that it cannot fully handle its workload. Although the 
number of staff members grew from 300 to 2200 between 2000 and 2017, the workload of each 
commissioner is still high and, as a result, the agency still has many outstanding cases (Pathmanand and 
Connors, 2019). In its 2017 annual report, the NACC reported a backlog of 15,363 cases out of a total of 
almost 50,000 cases that it had dealt with since its inception (NACC, 2017). This heavy workload results 
in long periods of time before cases are concluded. The agency has also not been very successful in 
securing convictions; only 105 of the 1285 cases sent to judicial authorities actually led to convictions 
(Pathmanand and Connors, 2019). The lengthy time period that court cases require and the low 
conviction rate enable corrupt individuals or agencies to act with a high degree of impunity. 
OVERVIEW OF EBMR’S WASTEWATER SECTOR 
As mentioned, wastewater is a major problem in the EBMR; this is evidenced by the poor water quality 
of the major rivers flowing through the area and the classification of Bangkok and the surrounding 
provinces as having "poor water quality". This was confirmed by government officers that we 
interviewed. For example, a Pathum Thani Provincial Administration Organisation (PAO) official stated 
that the wastewater situation in his province is "very bad" and a Samut Prakarn PAO officer declared that, 
"wastewater is getting worse". A Pollution Control Department (PCD) official agreed, saying that, "[t]he 
situation [in the EBMR] is getting worse and does not show any signs of changing". 
The three major sources of wastewater in the EBMR’s waterways and along its coasts are households, 
factories and agriculture/aquaculture. Bang Khun Thian (BKT) is a peri-urban subdistrict in southern 
Bangkok, bordering the Gulf of Thailand (Figure 3). The BKT District Assistant Director stated that 
wastewater in his district was a national environmental problem. He felt this to be the case because it 
came not only from Bangkok but also from many other provinces, since the Chao Phraya River, its 
tributaries, and hundreds of interlinked canals run through many provinces before flowing through BKT 
and then releasing their water into the Gulf of Thailand, and they thus bring wastewater from many 
sources. As of 2018, for the country overall, the industrial sector is the highest polluter, discharging up to 
18 million cubic metres (Mm3) of wastewater per day; this is followed by the municipal sector with 10 
Mm3 (which includes waste from residences and commercial buildings), and the agricultural sector at 3.9 
Mm3 (OECD, 2018). 
One source of wastewater that enters waterways which then flow down into BKT is households. 
According to a Department of Marine and Coastal Resources senior official, some small houses – such as 
those in slum areas – do not have septic tanks; also wastewater treatment is lacking in many villages and 
these households thus release their waste directly into canals and rivers. He added that Bangkok’s sewage 
system does not cover all households, with coverage rates estimated by the PCD to be between 60 and 
70%. Statistics confirm that much wastewater is untreated, with only 45 to 53% treated in the Bangkok 
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conurbation (Mrozik et al., 2019).1 A PCD senior official stated that many households in Bangkok and 
Samut Prakarn, a neighbouring province, operate small, household-size factories in their houses and 
illegally dump significant amounts of wastewater. A 2010 study conducted in Nonthaburi Province also 
found that new residential developments worsened wastewater quality in nearby canals (Honda et al., 
2010). 
Figure 3. Maps of a) the Bangkok subdistrict of Bang Khun Thian, and b) Thailand showing Bangkok. 
 
Source: NordNordWest (2009). 
Other sources of wastewater are factories, particularly those in the EBMR. While industrial estates have 
sufficient wastewater treatment facilities, some small factories do not, even though by law they are 
required to have them. While the PCD sets wastewater standards, the Ministry of Industry rarely enforces 
them. Despite the PCD seeking to enforce wastewater standards, the department has limited staff since, 
about a decade ago, the national government reduced the number of inspection officers in order to save 
money. There are thus only three such officers in each province, making it impossible for the officers to 
inspect all of the factories. As of 2018, over half of the factories near Bangkok’s San Saab canal – much of 
whose wastewater eventually flows into BKT – did not treat their wastewater properly (OECD, 2018). A 
2020 study by a local Thai NGO found that land and water samples taken from an industrial area in Muang 
                                                          
1 Mrozik et al. (2019) derived the cited statistics from two other articles; a 2013 article stated that 53% of wastewater in the 
Bangkok conurbation is treated (Buathong et al., 2013) whereas a 2016 article stated that 45% of the wastewater is treated 
(Thitanuwat et al., 2016). 
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District in Samut Sakhon province were "contaminated with high levels of arsenic, lead, cadmium, 
chromium, zinc, copper and nickel" (Kongrut 2020a). 
Agriculture and aquaculture farming also exacerbate the problem. Pig farms, for example, generate a 
significant amount of waste and some of it runs off into waterways; some upstream aquaculture farmers, 
such as fish and shrimp farmers, also do not treat their water adequately and thus cause downstream 
pollution, including in BKT. In 2017, hundreds of freshwater fish and shrimp farmers from Samut 
Songkhram and Phetchaburi protested outside the Ratchaburi provincial hall, complaining that the public 
waterways in their provinces were contaminated with untreated wastewater from a large pig farm in 
Ratchaburi’s Pak Tho district (Srinualchan, 2017). Farmers elsewhere along the Chao Phraya River have 
blamed wastewater for several mass die-offs of fish (Lebel et al., 2019). 
According to an official from a local NGO, worsening wastewater in the EBMR over the past few years 
has primarily been due to increased wastewater discharged from waste recycling, such as from the recent 
boom in smelting of electronic waste (Kongrut, 2020b; Jirenuwat and Diggleby, 2021; Juengsmarn and 
Saetang, 2021). The number of court cases around wastewater dumping has also increased in the past 
three years, although it remains relatively low. One major driver occurred in January 2018: after a quarter 
century of processing nearly half of the world’s recyclable waste, China enacted its 'National Sword' 
policy, which banned the import of most plastics and other materials used by the nation’s recycling 
processors (Katz, 2019). In response, Thailand struggled to expand its domestic capacity in order to keep 
pace with the surge in waste imports that had previously been absorbed by China (Marks et al., 2020). In 
2018 alone, Thailand received 481,000 tons of plastic waste imports, compared with 70,000 tons in 2016 
(Macan-Markar, 2019). According to this same NGO official, many of these recycling firms were 
discharging untreated wastewater. In 2018, for example, police raided Dexin Industries in Samut Prakarn 
after the government found that this Chinese company had been illegally dumping wastewater from its 
waste recycling process; the operators had already fled (Nanuam, 2018). 
Regulatory structure and political economy of the EBMR’s wastewater 
Besides increasing population and urbanisation in the areas upstream of the EBMR, there are a number 
of underlying political-economic drivers to this wastewater problem. First, there is the politics of position 
(upstream versus downstream) (Lebel et al., 2005). Similar to those who build floodwalls, upstream actors 
such as local governments, industries and fish farmers do not have strong incentives to reduce their 
wastewater because, flowing downstream, it does not affect them or their area. As a PCD officer 
declared, "When we talk about percent of wastewater, it varies from downstream to upstream. For 
downstream areas, they always have a problem of a higher pollution load". A local farmer in BKT 
concurred, saying that, "It is not fair. All the wastewater comes here from Bangkok before going in the 
ocean because we are south of Bangkok. The Bangkok government should control the water and improve 
sewage before it flows into the sea". 
The second political-economic driver is that, like many regulatory structures in Thailand, that of 
wastewater is fragmented both horizontally and vertically, weak and unclear. The major agencies 
involved in governing wastewater are: 
1. The Pollution Control Department (PCD), Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE); 
this agency identifies wastewater sources, sets standards such as those on wastewater treatment 
plants (WWTPs) and building effluent standards, and monitors quality; 
2. The Department of Industrial Works (DIW), Ministry of Industry; this department is responsible for 
overseeing wastewater from factories and can fine violators; 
3. Local government organisations, such as provincial bodies and municipalities; these are responsible 
for treating municipal wastewater from buildings such as hotels and residencies, and constructing 
WWTPs; 
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4. The Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP), MONRE; this agency 
administers the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, including wastewater; 
5. The Ministry of Agriculture; this ministry is responsible for governing wastewater generated by 
aquaculture farmers; 
6. The Wastewater Management Authority (WMA), Ministry of Interior; the WMA provides technical 
assistance to municipalities in constructing and running WWTPs and manages 15 WWTPs in the 
Lower Chao Phraya River Basin (Netherlands Embassy in Bangkok, 2016). 
The 1999 Decentralisation Act handed local administrative organisations (LAOs) such as municipalities 
additional responsibilities and power; this included the responsibility to safely dispose of wastewater. 
The central government has subsequently transferred funds to LAOs, including those in the EBMR, for 
the construction and monitoring of WWTPs (Tevapitak and Helmsing, 2019). Constituents elect local 
government leaders, including the mayors of Bangkok and Pattaya, while, at the same time, provincial-
level bodies are under the control of the national government (see Marks and Lebel, 2016). LAOs oversee 
86 WWTPs and the WMA oversees 15 (Netherlands Embassy in Bangkok, 2016). 
Each of the numerous agencies at the central, provincial and local levels has its own interests, and 
they rarely work together. Each ministry and department operates as a small kingdom, trying to control 
the issues and projects under its jurisdiction (Reynolds et al., 2012). This fragmentation is particularly 
stark in the state’s water management sector, where at least 31 departments in 10 ministries have 
overlapping and unintegrated responsibilities (Marks, 2019a). To make matters worse, 36 primary and 
2000 secondary laws, some of which contradict each other, regulate water (OECD, 2018). This high degree 
of fragmentation has caused conflicts of interest and interagency clashes over who should be responsible 
for wastewater. The PCD, for example, sets wastewater policies for factories but it is the DIW that is 
supposed to enforce it. However, the latter’s mandate is to expand industrial growth rather than curb it 
through environmental regulations. The national government also focuses its policy on improving solid 
waste management while neglecting wastewater (ibid). As a BKT community leader stated, "This problem 
is too big for the community to address. But the national government is not doing anything". Because of 
the lack of cooperation and differing incentive structures, as a senior PCD official declared, "It is a finger 
pointing game. Everybody is blaming each other [for the wastewater]". 
Third, the country’s incomplete decentralisation has weakened governance in the wastewater sector. 
While Thailand began decentralising and devolving power to LAOs in the 1990s, this process has been 
incomplete due to the retention of power and resources by central bureaucrats and the continued 
weakness of LAOs (see Marks and Lebel, 2016). LAOs in the Lower Chao Phraya Basin thus have a limited 
capacity to manage wastewater. As a PCD senior official explained, "Working on wastewater is too 
technical for local governments to do on their own". The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA)2 
also has a limited mandate to address industrial wastewater. If BMA officials find, for example, that 
factories within the BMA’s jurisdiction are releasing wastewater, they cannot directly order the factory 
to stop. Instead, they have to ask the DIW to do this, but often this department does not heed their 
requests. As a BMA officer stated, "So far BMA has no authority to order everything directly. So many 
agencies obstruct BMA". Within the BMA, some district offices, such as that of BKT, seek to help but have 
limited power. As a BKT community leader said, "the district office helps the most but it has little power 
and not much budget". The BKT District Assistant Director added that, "We are at the bottom of the 
hierarchy. The district has to send issues to BMA and then to the national government (…). The country 
is only partially decentralized. This means there are not clear solutions to address problems". When LAOs 
build WWTPs, it is difficult for them to raise enough capital to actually operate the plants. One reason for 
                                                          
2 A single metro-wide Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) was created in 1972; it replaced the Bangkok Municipality 
which administratively unified Bangkok and Thonburi. 
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this is that none of them charge wastewater fees. The BMA, for example, approved a regulation to collect 
a treatment fee, but the policy has not yet been implemented (Mrozik et al., 2019). 
The fourth political-economic driver is lack of electoral pressure and representation, which 
contributes to the problem. BKT farmers have voiced complaints about wastewater to the BMA and have 
requested its assistance. As one community representative lamented, however, the BMA had not taken 
any action thus far. According to a Mahidol University Professor and BMA consultant, the BMA’s inaction 
is because "[it] does not care about voters in the coastal zone; it only cares about voters in the inner city", 
the latter being much more densely populated and wealthier than the BKT. The BMA thus devotes its 
policy attention and budget to other problems facing its residents. 
Overall, the fragmented and weak governance of wastewater in the EBMR, combined with the lack of 
representation and the low priority placed on wastewater by national leaders, makes this sector more 
conducive to corruption. 
CORRUPTION IN THE EBMR’S WASTEWATER SECTOR 
Integrity failures play a key role in the increasing problem of the EBMR’s wastewater and in the failure of 
all levels of the Thai government to tackle this problem. Government officials, NGO officials, and 
community leaders all agreed with this. For example, a PAO officer in Pathum Thani declared that, 
regarding wastewater, "[t]here is corruption at the highest level". A Samut Prakarn PAO officer agreed, 
commenting that, "[t]he corruption issue is stopping solutions from being implemented". This section 
goes on to describe the three major types of corruption in the sector and examines their underlying 
drivers. 
Bribes to avoid paying wastewater fees or to enable illegal wastewater dumping 
A major source of corruption is at the citizen-institution interface; this includes bribes to government 
officials in order to obtain factory licenses or to avoiding paying fines or fees related to wastewater. 
According to Penchom Saetang, director of the local NGO, Ecological Alert and Recovery Thailand, it is 
also related to the rise of imported waste in Thailand, particularly in the EBMR. In June 2019, she raised 
the question, "What does Thailand want with this kind of waste?", and then herself answered that, 
"corruption has a lot to do with it" (quoted in Rojanaphruk, 2019). A Thai NGO official added that in June 
2020 she interviewed a recycling factory owner who told her that, according to the law, the licensing fee 
to operate that type of factory was around 10,000 baht. She added, however, that to obtain the license 
he had to pay one million baht to provincial DIW officers. One benefit he received in exchange for the 
bribe was that he would not be fined for discharging wastewater from his factory. She called this process 
a "vicious cycle" because it leads to a steady increase in corruption and wastewater dumping. 
Another alleged licensing case occurred in Rayong. As mentioned, farmers there complained that 
wastewater was destroying their crops. According to a local NGO official, at first this factory did not 
process waste and there was no wastewater problem. Problems arose, however, when the company Win 
Process took over the factory. The company obtained three factory licenses for operating different types 
of industrial activities: 1) Type 40, for sorting unusable materials, compressing paper, metal and plastic 
scraps; 2) Type 60, for smelting and casting metals; and 3) Type 106, for recycling used fuel oil and for 
container-cleaning with solvents (Pawa, 2020). The NGO official pointed out, however, that the owner 
should not have received the last two licenses because the factory is located in the middle of an 
agricultural community, not an industrial area, and it is illegal to operate those types of industrial 
processes in such areas. He raised the questions, "How could the company obtain the Type 60 and 106 
licenses if not for corruption? The [Win Process] owner is a politician in this province so he has very good 
connections. Is this why he can operate the company here?" His answer to these questions was that, 
"provincial [DIW] officers just ignored the [wastewater] problem"; they also ignored the complaints of 
the farmers and the NGO. As he further elaborated: 
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We tried to close this company for a long time but because the owner is a politician and the provincial office 
supported him by issuing the two licenses, the government closed their eyes when the people informed 
them that the factory was dumping wastewater into paddy fields. 
A former provincial officer of Chonburi Province, where the tourist city of Pattaya is located, stated that 
according to EIA regulations, if somebody wants to build a hotel of 80 rooms or more in Pattaya, before 
he or she can build the hotel the owner must submit an EIA report and receive approval from the 
provincial MONRE office. The EIA report must include a plan to treat wastewater, such as installing septic 
tanks and pipes which will connect the hotels to wastewater plants. To successfully obtain an EIA, 
however, the cost of the necessary equipment and technology and the inspection fees can amount to as 
much as 10 million baht and the process can take a long time. Therefore, according to the officer, "so 
many owners build only 79 rooms or pay the local offices a bribe to receive approval. About 70-80% of 
owners can build [hotels] without an EIA". Once officers receive the bribe, they do not monitor the 
wastewater from these hotels, even though some of the hotels directly drain their wastewater into public 
pipes. He said that this was the case not only in Pattaya but also in other tourist destinations such as 
Phuket and Koh Samui. Another NGO official added that when there are EIA hearings, officials sometimes 
receive bribes from company owners who hope to receive an EIA and, in exchange, "they let the EIA 
pass". 
Another example is from Om Yai municipality in Nakhon Pathom, which is about 35 km from Central 
Bangkok. A municipal officer told us that wastewater is a major problem here, with a major source being 
households. The municipality tries to force householders to install a septic tank to treat wastewater but, 
without enough municipal staff to monitor the situation, many households just release their wastewater 
directly into public waterways. The second major source of wastewater in Om Yai municipality is from 
factories. While some factories have built pipes which connect their wastewater to nearby WWTPs, 
others have installed pipes which illegally drain their wastewater into waterways. The municipal officer 
declared that most of the latter "have connections with politicians and decision-makers so the 
municipality cannot do anything". She also added that these factories often financially support municipal 
activities. 
Overall, many factories in the EBMR are not concerned about violating environmental laws regarding 
waste disposal, including wastewater. This is because, as a Thai NGO official opined, "provincial officers 
do not fulfil their duties in monitoring, regulating, and enforcing the laws. So the factories are not afraid 
anymore. They can just pay some money to the officers". In return, officials will respond more slowly or 
ignore complaints, avoid law enforcement, or warn polluting factories before inspections (Tevapitak and 
Helmsing, 2019). Bribery is therefore one key reason why the EBMR has the highest concentration of 
factories that do not comply with effluent standards (Figure 4). Other reasons – as already discussed – 
are the lack of inspectors and Thailand’s fragmented wastewater governance. 
Although interviewees did not give underlying reasons for extensive bribery, we suggest a few. 
Officials in this sector – as throughout the Thai bureaucracy – are poorly paid and they therefore have an 
incentive to supplement their incomes from bribe. Also, as discussed earlier – and again as is prevalent 
throughout the Thai bureaucracy – these agencies have a subculture of accepting bribes. The Om Yai and 
Rayong examples point to yet another driver, the prevalence of patron-client relationships. Patrons 
(politicians) protect their clients (factories) so that the latter can flout laws and evade fines. A final reason 
is the lack of transparency, which is discussed below. 
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Figure 4. Location of factories in Thailand; those with the blue dots comply with wastewater effluent 
standards and those with red dots do not. 
 
Source: Wangcharoenrung (2017). 
Corruption related to WWTPs 
The second major source of corruption is fraud within public financial management, specifically that of 
WWTPs. In July 2012, PCD Secretary General Wichien Jungrungruang stated that, nationwide, 83 billion 
baht (US$ 2.64 billion) had been spent on 101 WWTPs, 91 of which were fully completed. He then 
admitted that almost half of the country’s wastewater treatment facilities had serious operational 
problems and that, consequently, the country had only 43 'good' WWTPs (Bangkok Post, 2013). 
Unfortunately, this problem has not only continued but worsened. A Thai NGO official reported that as 
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of 2020 approximately 80% of wastewater treatment facilities were unusable or functioned poorly after 
they were constructed. Another Thai NGO official concurred, saying that, 
Many municipalities borrowed money from the [central government’s] environmental fund to build 
wastewater treatment plants but did not operate these plants very well because they could not afford the 
electricity costs. This is because they did not include this cost in their budgets. When they set their budget, 
they always request funding for hard equipment for construction, but not for the plants’ operations.3 
He added that they did this because these plants presented an easy opportunity for government officials 
to make money from bribes. He said that for local construction projects, including wastewater plants, "it 
is well-known that the central government takes 12%, the provincial government takes 7%, the middle 
level takes 5% and the lowest level takes a 3% commission. So in total 25% already of the costs" are 
fraudulent. Another Thai NGO official whom we interviewed confirmed this, commenting that, "There is 
a lot corruption in the procurement process. For example, a construction company might charge 40 
million baht for the plant, but really they spend 30 million baht on its construction". The head of a 
construction company agreed, telling us that, 
Normally we have to budget in at least an additional 30% [for corruption costs] (…). It starts 
from the time the government lists which companies can bid for the project. If you want to be on 
the list you have to pay (…). In the city there are many committees so we also need to pay those 
committees as well. 
As a result, contractors often overcharge for the plant’s construction materials and technology and often 
use those of poor quality. An NGO official asserted that land also plays an important role in the corruption 
process of wastewater plants, such as in site selection. The Khlong Dan example discussed below vividly 
illustrates this linkage. The NGO official further added that, 
We only have reliable evidence for one case: Khlong Dan. There are so many cases regarding wastewater 
plants not only in Bangkok but throughout Thailand but we don’t have enough reliable evidence on those 
cases. Most facilities are not usable or do not function well. 
A municipal officer of Pattaya, which has large population inflows from tourism, also suspects that 
corruption could have played a role in the poor performance of one of the city’s two wastewater plants, 
Soi Wat Boon. She said that a contractor was hired to build the plant for 125 million baht (US$ 3.8 million). 
She explained, however, that, 
[t]he plant did not operate properly during the test run period. The project was already finished too late and 
so the contractor’s contract had finished. Some said that the Pattaya mayor supported the contract and let 
the contract end so the municipality could not test what went wrong. There was likely under-the-table 
money given by the contractor to the Pattaya city staff. That is why the plant did not function well and there 
was no monitoring. As of now, the plant is not operating yet. 
In May 2018, Pattaya netizens complained to the national government and shared pictures online of 
visibly polluted wastewater being released on Pattaya beach; they also reported a foul smell. This was 
not the first time that such an incident had been reported in Pattaya (Pupattanapong, 2018). Wastewater 
from houses and businesses is channelled to the city’s wastewater plants. However, the city’s first plant, 
according to a municipal official, does not have sufficient capacity to treat the rapidly increasing volume 
of wastewater. Soi Wat Boon is the city’s second plant, which is supposed to enable the city to fully treat 
all of its wastewater. Corruption related to this plant is therefore likely contributing to the problem. The 
head of a construction company believes that corruption is worsening; he told us that, "Ten years ago, 
the government officials hesitated to ask for money, but now they ask for money like it is normal". 
                                                          
3 While there is no official data to back up this claim, a senior official of the Wastewater Management Authority stated that at 
least 35% of plants were not working well. 
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As stated by the Thai NGO official, the only clearly publicly documented case of corruption regarding 
WWTPs in the EBMR is Khlong Dan, which was supposed to treat the wastewater of 1.2 million 
residents and about 4000 factories. Although this case occurred more than five years ago, it is still 
worthwhile including in this report. Not only is it the only documented case of corruption, but its failure 
to be constructed due to fraud still contributes to insufficient wastewater treatment capacity in the 
EBMR. A Samut Prakarn provincial official stated that, "We do not have enough plants here. However, 
we have one at Khlong Dan but it still has not opened yet". 
Case Study: Khlong Dan wastewater plant 
Khlong Dan has been widely dubbed the "mother of all corruption cases" in Thailand. This mega-fraud 
project wasted around 23 billion baht (US$ 730.8 million) of public funds and was halted in 2003 due to 
corruption charges. The Supreme Administrative Court found widespread fraud in the land acquisitions 
for the project. The project was initiated in 1995 when the Thai cabinet first approved two wastewater 
plants in Samut Prakarn. In 1997, the project’s contract was signed between the Thai government and 
the NVPSKG4 consortium; the latter was led at the time by Vattana Asavahame, former Deputy Minister 
of Interior. By this time, the project site had been moved 20 km to Khlong Dan, located on the eastern 
edge of Samut Prakarn and about 20 km from Bangkok (Prateepchaikul, 2014) (Figure 5). The new joint 
venture plan proposed by the PCD was to build a centralised plant which would be one of the region’s 
largest WWTPs and would process 525,000 m3 a day (Mekong Watch, 2010). 
Figure 5. Map of Khlong Dan Wastewater Project. 
 
Source: Sohn (2007: 34). 
                                                          
4 NVPSKG stands for North West Water International Co, Vichitphan Construction, Prayoonviskarnchang Co, Seesaeng Karn 
Yotha Co, and Krungthon Engineering Co Group. 
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This change caused the construction costs to balloon from 13.6 billion baht to 22.9 billion baht, mainly 
due to the inflated cost of 1900-rai of land in Khlong Dan. Law enforcement authorities later found that 
PCD officials, executives of the joint venture, and the owners of the Khlong Dan property had conspired 
to inflate the purchase price of land parcels by as much as 1000% (Sohn, 2007). The authorities also 
concluded that the land purchased by the PCD included publicly-owned land, including canals, which had 
been illegally titled through corrupt dealings with the Land Ministry. Corrupt land officials had issued 
duplicate land rights documents for the same land plots owned by villagers who had refused to sell, 
causing legal disputes which never favoured the real owners (ibid). Furthermore, the Vattana-owned 
Muang Rai Lan Thong Company bought land from villagers at about 20,000 baht a rai. Subsequently, Palm 
Beach Development, whose directors included Vattana’s family members, bought the land at 100,000 
baht per rai; Khlong Dan Marine and Fishery then bought the land for 260,000 baht per rai. Throughout 
these transactions, no money was actually spent because the companies were all affiliated. The PCD then 
bought 1900 rai of land at about one million baht per rai. PCD officials also unfairly changed the terms of 
reference. This disqualified the other contender for the project, Marubeni Co, and singled out the land 
offered by Khlong Dan Marine and Fishery Co as the only available site. The NVPSKG consortium 
controlled this land (Prateepchaikul, 2014). 
Community members in Khlong Dan were upset about the project. They had not been consulted, were 
concerned that an EIA was never conducted, and felt that the land deals were unfair and crooked. They 
raised their concerns with the Asia Development Bank, which had provided a loan for the project, and 
with the new Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin visited Khlong Dan in 2002 and said in front of 
the villagers that "[t]his project is not transparent" (Mekong Watch, 2010). Subsequently in 2004, PCD 
filed criminal charges against 19 private firms and individuals, including Vattana. That same year, the Land 
Department revoked the deeds of Khlong Dan Marine and Fishery Co’s 1358 rai of land. This invalidated 
the joint venture with NVPSKG that the government had signed off on. In 2007, the National Counter 
Corruption Commission, NACC’s predecessor, concluded that nine government officials, including Mr. 
Vattana, were involved in illegal land deed acquisitions. They then forwarded the case to the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Administrative Court ruled that Vattana was guilty of bribing officials to obtain illegal 
land titles and sentenced him to 10 years. However, he fled the country before his conviction 
(Prateepchaikul, 2014). In 2015, the lengthy investigation also led to 20-year jail sentences for three 
former PCD officials (Bangkok Post, 2018). The PCD was also ordered to pay compensation for violating 
the terms of the project’s contract (which in the end was paid by taxpayers). 
As a result of the fraud, the plant was never built. This presumably means that much of the wastewater 
of the thousands of factories and residences which the plant was supposed to treat remains untreated 
or insufficiently treated. It also means that the Thai state lost 23 billion baht. More positively, this is the 
only publicly proven case of corruption related to WWTPs in Thailand and the only one that has led to 
criminal convictions of state officials, including a former Deputy Minister. This case also suggests that 
Thai communities can successfully expose and stop corrupt projects (Sohn, 2007). 
We argue that WWTP fraud is consistent with several aspects of the political economy of the EBMR’s 
wastewater. The country’s decentralisation led to additional financial resources apportioned to LAOs and 
consequently also increased opportunities for fraud at the local level (Shatkin, 2004). Since the majority 
of WWTPs are the responsibility of LAOs, they present local politicians with an enticing opportunity for 
profiteering. At the same time, as the example of Khlong Dan shows, at the national level Thailand’s 
political system of "competitive clientelism" (Doner and Ramsay, 1997) – in which political factions 
compete incessantly for rent-seeking opportunities for their group of business allies – can lead to hugely 
corrupt projects. Finally, although the community was able to expose corruption in the Khlong Dan case, 
it is an exception. Most perpetrators of corruption related to WWTP projects remain unpunished. Due to 
the hidden nature of wastewater and the limited ability of the public to monitor the performance of 
WWTPs, there are minimal "public outcries over high-profile failures" (Smith and Walker, 2019: 227). This 
means that WWTP construction lends itself readily to the embezzlement of funds. 
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Wider integrity failures 
There are a number of wider integrity failures which also significantly exacerbate wastewater problems 
and which enable the persistence of the first two types of corruption. First, to return to the issue of 
WWTPs, according to a Pattaya municipal officer, local politicians in the EBMR, particularly mayors, prefer 
to spend their budgets on the construction of more lucrative and politically advantageous projects, rather 
than on building WWTPs and obtaining EIA licenses. The officer explained that in 2010 the national 
government identified Pattaya as a special area for environmental protection. This meant that if the 
Pattaya municipality wanted to build a WWTP with a capacity of more than 3000 m3 per day, which is 
what Pattaya needs, the city needs to receive an EIA approval before any expansion can occur. The 
problems, however, are not only that obtaining an EIA approval requires a lengthy approval process, but 
also that the Pattaya municipal government did not prepare a budget for this project. Budget allocation 
depends on local politicians such as the Pattaya mayor, but these politicians prefer to spend money on 
roads, floodwalls and buildings. The official reckoned that this is because such projects still present 
lucrative opportunities for procurement corruption and can also boost these politicians’ re-election 
prospects. As Larkin argues (2013: 333), these projects are not merely technical; "[they] also operate on 
the level of fantasy and desire". Voters can more easily see projects that produce roads and other visible 
infrastructure and can more readily gauge their potential benefits; meanwhile, as the Pattaya municipal 
official also stated, wastewater treatment "is hidden underground so voters will not care about it unless 
it affects their lives". 
A second failure of integrity occurred in April 2019, when the National Legislative Assembly under the 
military government revised the country’s 1992 Factory Act. According to a local Thai NGO, this case is a 
strong example of business groups lobbying to weaken regulations through exerting pressure and 
influence. Supant Mongkolsuthree, chair of the Federation of Thai Industries, supported the new 
amendment, stating that, "More than 80% of factories are SMEs [Small and Medium Enterprises], and 
they need support from the government more than large factories do" (quoted from Apisitniran and 
Maikaew, 2018). Under the new law, only industrial companies with more than 50 employees which have 
machinery exceeding 50 horsepower are subject to monitoring for waste discharge, including wastewater 
and anti-pollution measures. Analysts project that over 40% of the country’s factories will benefit from 
the looser regulations, including companies with licenses to import electronic waste for recycling (Macan-
Markar, 2019). Furthermore, factory licenses will no longer be subjected to a renewal process, instead 
allowing companies to extend their operation licenses without undergoing the verifications which had 
previously been required (Roberts-Davis and Saetang, 2019). Consequently, as Penchom Saetang argues, 
"not only will these small factories pop up everywhere, they will also not be subjected to regular 
inspections" (quoted from Rujivanarom, 2019). 
Various NGOs, however, believe that this new law is unfair and that it is designed to satisfy business 
groups. They feel, in particular, that the law will increase pollution and corruption and will facilitate an 
increase in waste imports. "The new Factory Act opens the doors for companies to invest in factories and 
plants that will result in the country becoming more polluted", said Supaporn Malailoy, manager of the 
local NGO Enlaw Foundation. As Penchom also stated, the new law "will increase non-transparency and 
corruption" and will cause "worse environmental problems" to "pop up" (quoted from Macan-Markar, 
2019). This amendment to the Factory Act followed another law which had disappointed 
environmentalists: Order Number 4/2559. Passed by the military government in 2016 without any 
consultation, this order suspended town and city planning laws that had previously prevented the 
opening of toxic and polluting waste processing projects in areas upstream of, or near, where people live 
and farm. Somnuck Jongmeewasin, an academic at Silpakorn University International College, argued 
that the order has increased the number of waste processing factories across the country because a new 
plant or factory "only needs permission from local authorities". But, as Somnuck asserted, this order also 
led to "corruption between the local government officials and the companies" (quoted in Macan-Markar, 
2019). 
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The third failure of integrity occurs when government officials laxly enforce regulations regarding 
wastewater and when they monitor wastewater pollution in such a way as to conform to the 
government’s priority of supporting factories and other businesses. A PCD official stated that the PCD, 
which cannot bring the law to bear in instances of non-compliance, will inform the DIW that factories are 
illegally dumping wastewater and will then send them the test results. When this occurs, however, the 
DIW does not fine these factories; instead, it informs them in advance of its visit. Consequently, "when 
[DIW] staff visits, the factory will have already temporarily improved its water quality, so DIW will not 
find anything" and, after the DIW visit, the factory will revert to its old practice of secretly dumping 
wastewater. Another PCD official stated that government officials from other agencies, including PCD 
and the police, knew that factories were illegally dumping wastewater but turned a blind eye to the 
problem; he stated that, "us officers know that something is wrong but we just ignore it". He called this 
practice "not my business corruption". Despite the two agencies’ delineation of responsibilities, they 
rarely conduct joint inspections or systematically corroborate findings (Roberts-Davis and Saetang, 2019). 
Relatedly, a third PCD official stated that farmers’ feeding of river fish is illegal and is polluting the rivers 
due to the fish farms’ release of untreated wastewater into those rivers (Sampantamit et al., 2020). Many 
farmers continue to do so, however, as the Ministry of Agriculture secretly allows it to happen. This is 
because, according to the same official, Ministry officials prioritise the interests of farmers over those of 
the wider public. 
These integrity failures have arisen due to the undue influence of business groups on the policy-
making process that has risen since the 2014 coup (see Kanchoochat et al., 2021); it is also due to 
intergovernmental fragmentation and conflicts of interest. The politics of visibility play their part as well; 
that is, groundwater resources such as treated wastewater, being less visible, receive less attention from 
the public and the press (Colven, 2020) and thus are a lower priority for political leaders. 
Current and past attempts at, and barriers to, reducing integrity failures 
There have been only a few successes so far in terms of curbing illegal wastewater dumping. First, victims 
of pollution can sue polluters in court, though such cases are rare. Under Thai civil law the burden of 
proof lies with the party that is making the complaint; this can be difficult to prove given the often 
multiple potential sources of wastewater. Two exceptions to this were Khlong Dan and a 2009 case in 
Bangkok. In the latter case, a restaurant and fish farm owner successfully sued a vehicle spare parts 
company for releasing untreated wastewater into a public waterway and thereby damaging his property 
and assets (Lebel et al., 2019). 
The second success was the aforementioned case in Rayong. A group of local farmers, with the support 
of a local environmental watchdog NGO, brought the case to the media and sent complaints to 
government agencies at multiple levels. They then filed a complaint in Thailand’s administrative court 
(Kongrut, 2020b). In May 2020, the Rayong Provincial Industry Office issued three orders to Win Process 
Company, ordering the Type 60 and 106 factories to shut down because their operations broke the law, 
and directing the Type 40 factory to more accurately redefine its territory. The PCD also collected samples 
of soil and of surface and underground water for further investigations and potential actions against Win 
Process. The DIW also threatened to shut the company down if it did not comply with the law (Pawa, 
2020). The local NGO hopes that these actions will lead to the company’s closure. 
Another example of a successful community group is the We Love Tha Chin River Club 
(ชมรมเรารกัแม่นํา้ท่าจนี) which was formed in Nakhon Pathom in 1998. After receiving a little funding, this 
group raised awareness about the problem of wastewater dumping and acted as a communal watchdog, 
reporting those in the community who were dumping wastewater and then asking them to stop. If they 
continued to do so, the group reported them to officials. A Bangkok-based NGO official cautioned, 
however, that these cases are rare and that it "depends on whether local people and communities can 
Water Alternatives – 2021  Volume 14 | Issue 3 
Marks and Breen: Corruption in Bangkok’s wastewater sector 813 
organise themselves to file a lawsuit or conduct a campaign to exert pressure on the local government. 
The problem will just grow if there is no pressure". 
One reason why there have only been a handful of successful cases is that the freedom of information 
(FOI) law has been weakly implemented. The Thai constitution guarantees citizens’ right to access 
information from the government before the approval or implementation of activities that may have 
adverse environmental or health impacts on their communities. About a decade ago, the Thai 
government also created rules under its FOI law that require officials to proactively disclose 
environmental and health information to the public. This means that state officials are obliged to release 
companies’ permission documents, information on the amount of pollutants they release, and 
explanations of public health impacts (Excell and Moses, 2017). In theory, such legislation should enable 
victims to access water pollution information, including that related to wastewater; however, the feeble 
implementation of these laws, the gaps in the law, and the limited investment in information disclosure 
systems have undermined this legislation (ibid). Under Thai law, there is no legally specified time period 
in which information requests about industrial facilities must be acknowledged, and no deadline for 
officials to respond. Community members may thus only obtain information after several calls, or they 
may receive responses months after the request has been submitted (Roberts-Davis and Saetang, 2019). 
A 2017 study found that although Thai government officials responded to about 75% of information 
requests, they took over 60 days to respond. Moreover, they often released data that was only 
tangentially related to the citizens’ queries (Excell and Moses, 2017). 
UNEVEN LOSSES AND GAINS IN THE WASTEWATER SECTOR 
The effects of corruption have clearly worsened water quality in the EBMR. One group that has suffered 
from the increase in wastewater is smallholder farmers in BKT and Samut Prakarn. They told us that the 
incomes they generated from aquaculture production have dropped precipitously in recent years. Some 
had stopped farming and had sold their plots of land, retired, switched to becoming handymen, or 
migrated to Bangkok to find a new source of income. They pointed to wastewater intrusion and the 
outbreaks of disease that it caused as being a major reason for the vulnerability of their livelihoods. 
Farmers stated that wastewater became a serious problem about a decade ago, around 2010/2011.5 
Wastewater entered the farmers’ aquaculture farms, causing the aquatic life to die. Many interviewees 
stated that the wastewater problem is worst between October and December, the end of the rainy 
season. The percentage of productivity (and thus income) losses ranged from 30 to 90%. The incursion of 
wastewater was a major factor pushing one farmer to sell his land. Various farmers stated that, 
• "I lose about 90% from wastewater. I have to buy small shrimp and crabs to grow instead of obtaining 
it from nature and sea. In the past, didn’t have to buy; it grew in nature". 
• "Wastewater caused 80% reduction in my income. Before I could get 30,000 baht per day, now only 
300-500 baht. I’m scared that my children’s generation will need to move". 
• "I was a shrimp farmer before but now am retired. I sold my land because in the past shrimp grew 
naturally but now they don’t and the quantity has decreased. Wastewater is a big problem". 
• "Previously locals were quite rich and prosperous. Now we have lost more than three-quarter (75%) 
of our production due to wastewater. Nothing is left, only debt". 
                                                          
5 While farmers did not mention why wastewater became worse during these years, in 2010 flooding damaged 15 wastewater 
plants, worsening water quality in the Chao Phraya River Basin (Pollution Control Department, 2011). In 2011, Thailand suffered 
its worst floods in many years, including in many industrial areas (Marks, 2019a); once the floodwater reached BKT, it thus 
included high levels of wastewater. 
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The frequency of polluted water entering their aquaculture ponds has also increased in recent years. As 
one community leader explained, "Since 2011, the situation has become worse. First wastewater came 
three times per year. Now it is more than four to five times per year. But nobody knows why". 
Both farmers and government officials unanimously agreed that wastewater was a bigger problem 
than the more widely reported issue of coastal erosion (see, for example, Marks, 2019b) because it 
affected all farmers regardless of whether they lived along the coast or inland. As one community leader 
asserted, "Wastewater affects everybody who does aquaculture – water is most important for us. In 
previous times, the priority was coastal erosion but now coastal erosion only affects those who live along 
the coast" (see also Lebel et al., 2019). 
It is not only in Bangkok and Samut Prakarn that smallholder farmers suffer from wastewater 
intrusion; it is throughout the EBMR. In June 2020, for example, smallholders in the Ban Khai District of 
Rayong Province complained to the media that wastewater had leaked into a local rubber plantation and 
ruined 10 rai of crops (Kongrut, 2020b). 
The environmental problems suffered by these farmers – which they themselves did not create – 
reflect a politics of position that most affects those downstream and on the urban periphery of Bangkok. 
Om Yai municipality, for example, is upstream of BKT. BKT has also been a low priority of BMA’s leaders, 
while government departments at different scales, such as the PCD and DIW, are fragmented and 
sometimes in conflict with each other. Farmers in Samut Prakarn face worse wastewater because the 
nearby Khlong Dan project was never built. Overall, wastewater quality in the EBMR has worsened 
because of bureaucratic fragmentation, low prioritisation, and lack of electoral pressure to address this 
issue. Livelihoods downstream were also adversely affected. Not only farmers, however, suffer from 
corruption in this sector. The wider public does as well, including those living in Pattaya and other places 
where WWTPs are not fully operational. The public also must pay taxes that fund overly inflated, poor 
quality WWTPs. Due to limited accountability and transparency, those affected have little ability to 
correct these injustices. 
A small group of actors have, on the other hand, personally benefitted from this corruption. These 
include local-level politicians who receive bribes from construction companies as part of the procurement 
process of funding WWTPs, and bureaucrats such as those from the DIW who receive under-the-table 
payments in return for factory licences or for turning a blind eye to factories and hotels discharging illegal 
wastewater. Bureaucrats ignore illegal wastewater dumping in order to further their own careers and 
fulfil their agencies’ mandates. Wealthier and better-connected business owners such as those owning 
hotels and factories are, in turn, able to discharge as much wastewater as they want without being 
punished. Corruption in this sector thus contributes to inequality in a country already ranked as one of 
the most unequal in the world (Lindsay, 2019). 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyse the political economy of corruption in the EBMR’s wastewater sector, including 
the regulatory landscape and identification of key actors. We also offer a comprehensive overview of the 
different types of integrity failures that are occurring. We find that horizontal and vertical fragmentation, 
weak oversight of corruption, deregulation of environmental requirements, and perverse incentive 
structures among state agencies have facilitated widely spread corrupt behaviour in the sector. 
Corruption in this sector is significant in a number of ways. As Adam et al. (2020: 11) argue, "corruption 
corrodes public institutions and causes the loss of legitimacy and credibility of the State in the eyes of 
citizens". Thailand has been experiencing widespread protests in 2020 and 2021, partially due to the 
erosion of the state’s credibility in the minds of the nation’s youths (Bandow, 2020). As this paper also 
shows, corruption in the wastewater sector worsens inequality. It benefits government officials and 
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business owners while at the same time hurting the livelihoods of the poor such as smallholder farmers, 
and worsening the quality of the water which is vital to their livelihoods. 
This study reveals three important insights that contribute to a broader understanding of the political 
economy of corruption in the wastewater sector. First, echoing Colven’s (2020) argument about land 
subsidence in Jakarta, wastewater’s inherently limited visibility draws less attention to it and makes it 
easier for corruption to arise and more difficult for it to be addressed. Second, it has been argued that 
decentralisation, by bringing management closer to service recipients, can reduce corruption (McGuire, 
2010). Our findings suggest, however, that decentralisation is no silver bullet for improving wastewater 
management and reducing corruption. The third insight is that, as Goel and Nelson (2011) found in the 
US, more fragmented horizontal and vertical governance structures can heighten corruption activities. In 
the wastewater sector, fragmentation creates more opportunities for rent generation and reduces 
accountability and transparency. 
A number of policy implications can also be drawn from our findings. In order to reduce integrity 
failures in the wastewater sector, the Thai government should revise the Factory Act based on public 
input. New facilities should be subjected to public hearings, EIAs, and emissions inventories; discharge 
permits should be required; and pollution data (including that of wastewater) should be released to the 
public. All information should be easy for the public to access and should be clearly readable in order to 
increase transparency (Roberts-Davis and Saetang, 2019). Another related suggestion for reducing 
integrity failures is improvement in the implementation of its Freedom of Information law. The Thai 
government should mandate a specific timeframe within which officials must release information about 
polluting industries to those who request it. It should also revise laws regarding the authority to fine and 
charge those who illegally discharge wastewater. The PCD’s authority should be expanded to cover more 
sources of wastewater, including industrial, agricultural and residential. Other agencies, such as the DIW, 
which has been deemed corrupt, should be stripped of their authority. This would also reduce 
intergovernmental fragmentation related to wastewater governance. Finally, as suggested by an NGO 
interviewee, the PCD and other actors should raise the capacity of local watchdogs such as the We Love 
Tha Chin River Club by providing them with additional funding and helping them network with 
government officials and other watchdogs. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
We would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Water Integrity Network (WIN) and would like 
to thank Kittima Leeruttanawisut for her assistance with the research. We are also grateful to François  
Molle for helping improve the manuscript. 
REFERENCES 
Adam, I.; Fazekas, M.; Regös, N.; Tóth, B.; Basani, M. and Gamba, J. 2020. Beyond leakages: Quantifying the effects 
of corruption on the water and sanitation sector in Latin America and the Caribbean. Inter-American 
Development Bank, https://publications.iadb.org/en/node/29342 (accessed 28 February 2021) 
Anbarci, N.; Escaleras, M. and Register, C.A. 2009. The ill effects of public sector corruption in the water and 
sanitation sector. Land Economics 85(2): 363-377. 
Apisitniran, L. and Maikaew, P. 2018. Laxer factory licence renewals coming. Bangkok Post. 26 October 2018, 
www.bangkokpost.com/business/1564618/laxer-factory-licence-renewals-coming (accessed 6 July 2020) 
Araral, E. and Wang, Y. 2013. Water governance 2.0: A review and second generation research agenda. Water 
Resources Management 27(11): 3945-3957. 
Auriol, E. and Blanc, A. 2009. Capture and corruption in public utilities: The cases of water and electricity in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Utilities Policy 17(2): 203-216. 
Water Alternatives – 2021  Volume 14 | Issue 3 
Marks and Breen: Corruption in Bangkok’s wastewater sector 816 
Bandow, D. 2020. Thailand’s military is getting ready for another crackdown. Foreign Policy. 3 December 2020, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/03/thailand-military-crackdown-protests-biden/  (accessed 5 March 2021) 
Bangkok Post. 2013. Wastewater treatment should be a priority too. 26 May 2013, 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/351829/wastewater-treatment-should-be-a-priority-too  
(accessed 5 July 2020) 
Bangkok Post. 2018. B6bn Klong Dan water plant damage erased. Bangkok Post. 6 March 2018, 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1423354/b6bn-klong-dan-water-plant-damage-erased  
(accessed 5 July 2020) 
Bangkok Post. 2019. Graft panel an oddity. Bangkok Post. 16 September 2019, 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1751009/graft-panel-an-oddity  (accessed 2 July 2020) 
Buathong, T.; Boontanon, S.K.; Boontanon, N.; Surinkul, N.; Harada, H. and Fujii, S. 2013. Nitrogen flow analysis in 
Bangkok City, Thailand: Area zoning and questionnaire investigation approach. Procedia Environmental Sciences 
17: 586-595, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proenv.2013.02.074  
Butterworth, J. and De La Harpe, J. 2009. Grand designs: Corruption risks in major water infrastructure projects. 27. 
U4 Brief. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center. 
Carr, G.; Blöschl, G. and Loucks, D.P. 2012. Evaluating participation in water resource management: A review. Water 
Resources Research 48(11): 1-17. 
Colven, E. 2020. Subterranean infrastructures in a sinking city: The politics of visibility in Jakarta. Critical Asian 
Studies 52(3): 311-331, https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2020.1793210  
Davis, J. 2004. Corruption in public service delivery: Experience from South Asia’s water and sanitation sector. World 
Development 32(1): 53-71. 
Doner, R. and Ramsay, A. 1997. Competitive clientelism and economic governance: The case of Thailand. In 
Maxfield, S. and Ross Schneider, B. (Eds), Business and the state in developing countries, pp. 237-276. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Duflo, E.; Galiani, S. and Mobarak, M. 2012. Improving access to urban services for the poor: Open Issues and a 
Framework for a Future Research Agenda. J-PAL Urban Services Review Paper. Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action 
Lab. 
Excell, C. and Moses, E. 2017. Thirsting for justice: Transparency and poor people’s struggle for clean water in 
Indonesia, Mongolia, and Thailand. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute,  
https://www.wri.org/publication/thirsting-for-justice  (accessed 6 July 2020) 
Fan, C.S.; Lin, C. and Treisman, D. 2009. Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world. 
Journal of Public Economics 93(1-2): 14-34. 
Fisher, C. 2021. Map of a) Thailand; b) the Extended Bangkok Metropolitan Region; and c) the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Region. 
Gandy, M. 2008. Landscapes of disaster: Water, modernity, and urban fragmentation in Mumbai. Environment and 
Planning A 40(1): 108-130. 
Goel, R.K. and Nelson, M.A. 2011. Government fragmentation versus fiscal decentralization and corruption. Public 
Choice 148(3-4): 471-490. 
Gonzalez de Asis, M.; O’Leary, D.; Ljung, P. and Butterworth, J. 2009. Improving transparency, integrity, and 
accountability in water supply and sanitation: Action, learning, experiences. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Harris, D.; Kooy, M. and Jones, L. 2011. Analysing the governance and political economy of water and sanitation 
service delivery. Working Paper 334. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Honda, R.; Hara, Y.; Sekiyama, M. and Hiramatsu, A. 2010. Impacts of housing development on nutrients flow along 
canals in a peri-urban area of Bangkok, Thailand. Water Science and Technology 61(4): 1073-1080, 
https://doi.org/10.2166/wst.2010.529 
Jirenuwat, R. and Diggleby, L. 2021. Thai communities grapple with pollution in economic corridor. China Dialogue, 
https://chinadialogue.net/en/pollution/thai-communities-grapple-with-pollution-in-economic-corridor/  
(accessed 17 September 2021) 
Water Alternatives – 2021  Volume 14 | Issue 3 
Marks and Breen: Corruption in Bangkok’s wastewater sector 817 
Juengsmarn, P. and Saetang, P. 2021. Government must ban imports of plastic scrap. Bangkok Post. 27 August 2021, 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2171983/government-must-ban-imports-of-plastic-scrap  
(accessed 17 September 2021) 
Kanchoochat, V.; Aiyara, T. and Ngamarunchot, B. 2021. Sick tiger: Social conflict, state-business relations and 
exclusive growth in Thailand. Journal of Contemporary Asia 0(0): 1-22,  
https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2020.1869997  
Katz, C. 2019. Piling up: How China’s ban on importing waste has stalled global recycling. Yale E360, 
https://e360.yale.edu/features/piling-up-how-chinas-ban-on-importing-waste-has-stalled-global-recycling  
(accessed 21 August 2020) 
Kenny, C. 2009. Measuring corruption in infrastructure: Evidence from transition and developing countries. The 
Journal of Development Studies 45(3): 314-332. 
Khaosod. 2018. แฉคอรร์ปัช ัน่ยงัรุนแรง ตดิสนิบนเจอบ่อยสุด คาดมูลค่าเสยีหายกว่า 200,000 ลา้น. 15 February 2018, 
https://www.khaosod.co.th/economics/news_755850  (accessed 3 July 2020) 
Kjellén, M. 2018. Wastewater governance and the local, regional and global environments. Water Alternatives 
11(2): 219. 
Knack, S. 2007. Measuring corruption: A critique of indicators in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Journal of Public 
Policy 27(3): 255-291. 
Kongrut, A. 2020a. Pollution taints seaside community’s prosperity. Bangkok Post. 9 February 2020, 
www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/special-reports/1853759/pollution-taints-seaside-communitys-prosperity  
(accessed 4 July 2020) 
Kongrut, A. 2020b. Wastewater sparks local ire. Bangkok Post. 8 June 2020, 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1930900/wastewater-sparks-local-ire (accessed 4 July 2020) 
Krause, M. 2007. The political economy of water and sanitation in developing countries: Cross-country evidence 
and a case study on Colombia. PhD thesis. University of Giessen. 
Krause, M. 2010. The political economy of water and sanitation. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge. 
Krolikowski, A. 2014. Can mobile-enabled payment methods reduce petty corruption in urban water provision? 
Water Alternatives 7(1): 235-255. 
Larkin, B. 2013. The politics and poetics of infrastructure. Annual Review of Anthropology 42(1): 327-343. 
Lebel, L.; Garden, P. and Imamura, M. 2005. The politics of scale, position, and place in the governance of water 
resources in the Mekong Region. Ecology and Society 10(2): 18. 
Lebel, L.; Lebel, P. and Chuah, C.J. 2019. Water use by inland aquaculture in Thailand: Stakeholder perceptions, 
scientific evidence, and public policy. Environmental Management 63(4): 554-563. 
Lindsay, S. 2019. Thailand’s wealth inequality is the highest in the world: What will this mean for the upcoming 
elections? ASEAN Today. 16 January 2019, https://www.aseantoday.com/2019/01/thailands-wealth-inequality-
is-the-highest-in-the-world-what-does-this-mean-for-upcoming-elections/ (accessed 16 November 2020) 
Macan-Markar, M. 2019. New law in Thailand risks drawing an avalanche of plastic waste. Nikkei Asian Review. 26 
June 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Environment/New-law-in-Thailand-risks-drawing-an-avalanche-
of-plastic-waste  (accessed 28 October 2019) 
Marks, D. 2019a. Assembling the 2011 Thailand floods: Protecting farmers and inundating high-value industrial 
estates in a fragmented hydro-social territory. Political Geography 68: 66-76. 
Marks, D. 2019b. The political ecology of climate injustice in Bangkok. In Bracken, G.; Rabé, P.; Parthasarathy, R.; 
Sami, N. and Zhang, B. (Eds), Future challenges of cities in Asia, pp. 155-182. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press. 
Marks, D. and Lebel, L. 2016. Disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: Fragmented 
and contested responses to the 2011 floods in Central Thailand. Habitat International 52: 57-66. 
Marks, D.; Miller, M.A. and Vassanadumrongdee, S. 2020. The (geo)political economy of Thailand’s marine plastic 
pollution crisis. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 61(2): 266-282. 
McGuire, J.M. 2010. Decentralization for satisfying basic needs: An economic guide for policymakers. 2nd ed. 
Charlotte, NC: IAP. 
Water Alternatives – 2021  Volume 14 | Issue 3 
Marks and Breen: Corruption in Bangkok’s wastewater sector 818 
Mekong Watch. 2010. Samut Prakarn (Klong Dan) Wastewater Management Project in Thailand. Bangkok: Mekong 
Watch. 
Montgomery, M.A. and Elimelech, M. 2007. Water and sanitation in developing countries: Including health in the 
equation. Environmental Science & Technology 41(1): 17-24. 
Mrozik, W.; Vinitnantharat, S.; Thongsamer, T.; Pansuk, N.; Pattanachan, P.; Thayanukul, P.; Acharya, K.; Baluja, 
M.Q.; Hazlerigg, C.; Robson, A.F.; Davenport, R.J. and Werner, D. 2019. The food-water quality nexus in 
periurban aquacultures downstream of Bangkok, Thailand. Science of the Total Environment 695: 133923. 
NACC. 2017. Raignan prajam pi 2560. Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission. 
Nanuam, W. 2018. Prawit orders end to imports of hazardous waste. Bangkok Post. 20 June 2018, 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1489106/prawit-orders-end-to-imports-of-hazardous-waste  
(accessed 4 July 2020) 




NordNordWest. 2009. Deutsch: Lagekarte der Provinz Bangkok, Thailand, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Thailand_Bangkok_locator_map.svg (accessed 3 June 2016) 
OECD. 2018. Multi-dimensional review of Thailand: Volume 1. Initial assessment. OECD Development Pathways. 
Paris, www.oecd.org/publications/multi-dimensional-review-of-thailand-volume-1-9789264293311-en.htm  
(accessed 5 December 2019) 
Parnwell, M.J. and Wongsuphasawat, L. 1997. Between the global and the local: Extended metropolitanisation and 
industrial location decision making in Thailand. Third World Planning Review 19: 119-138. 
Pathmanand, U. and Connors, M.K. 2019. Thailand’s public secret: Military wealth and the state. Journal of 
Contemporary Asia 0(0): 1-25, https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1635632  
Pawa, N. 2020. Polluting factories ordered to shut down after a decade of community outcry. Arnika. 
https://english.arnika.org/news/polluting-factories-ordered-to-shut-down-after-a-decade-of-community-
outcry (accessed 5 July 2020) 
Persons, L.S. 2016. The way Thais lead: Face as social capital. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. 
Pollution Control Department. 2011. Thailand State of Pollution 2010. 
Prateepchaikul, V. 2014. Klong Dan, the "mother of corruption" cases. Bangkok Post. 24 November 2014, 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/445034/klong-dan-the-mother-of-corruption-cases (accessed 
16 December 2019) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2020. Staying on top of Keeping on top in a never-ending war: PwC’s Thailand Economic 
Crime and Fraud Survey 2020. Bangkok, https://www.pwc.com/th/en/consulting/forensic/assets/GECS-report-
2020-th-5.pdf (accessed 3 July 2020) 
Pupattanapong, C. 2018. Uproar over Pattaya beach wastewater. Bangkok Post. 14 May 2018, 
www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1464710/uproar-over-pattaya-beach-wastewater (accessed 5 July 
2020) 
Puttanapong, N. 2018. Monocentric growth and productivity spillover in Thailand. 23. BRC Research Report. 
Bangkok: JETRO Bangkok / IDE-JETRO. 
Reinikka, R. and Svensson, J. 2006. Using micro-surveys to measure and explain corruption. World Development 
34(2): 359-370. 
Reynolds, C.; Nishizaki, Y.; Glassman, J.; Farrelly, N.; Busbarat, P.; Lim, S.; Haberkorn, T. and Chachavalpongpun, P. 
2012. Time’s arrow and the burden of the past: A primer on the Thai Un-State. Sensate. 
www.academia.edu/36057192/times_arrow_and_the_burden_of_the_past_a_primer_on_the_thai_un_state 
(accessed 5 July 2020) 
Roberts-Davis, T.L. and Saetang, P. 2019. Trading away health and the environment: The toxic business of waste 
imports into Thailand. Bangkok: Ecological Alert and Recovery – Thailand (EARTH),  
https://english.arnika.org/publications/trading-away-health-and-the-environment-the-toxic-business-of-
waste-imports-into-thailand (accessed 6 July 2020) 
Water Alternatives – 2021  Volume 14 | Issue 3 
Marks and Breen: Corruption in Bangkok’s wastewater sector 819 
Rojanaphruk, P. 2019. As world’s trash floods Thailand, activists call for waste import ban. Khaosod English. 19 June 
2019, https://www.khaosodenglish.com/news/bangkok/2019/06/19/as-worlds-trash-floods-thailand-activists-
call-for-waste-import-ban/ (accessed 5 July 2020) 
Rose, J. and Heywood, P.M. 2013. Political science approaches to integrity and corruption. Human Affairs 23(2): 
148-159. 
Rujivanarom, P. 2019. Activists up in arms over new factory law. The Nation Thailand. 20 February 2019, 
http://nationthailand/national/30364470  (accessed 6 July 2020) 
Sampantamit, T.; Ho, L.; Lachat, C.; Sutummawong, N.; Sorgeloos, P. and Goethals, P. 2020. Aquaculture production 
and its environmental sustainability in Thailand: Challenges and potential solutions. Sustainability 12(5): 16. 
Shatkin, G. 2004. Globalization and local leadership: Growth, power and politics in Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28(1): 11-26. 
Sirisophonphong, P. 2019. The roles of digital media in developing and strengthening public procurement in 
Thailand. PhD Thesis. University of Glasgow. 
Smith, H.M. and Walker, G. 2019. The political economy of wastewater in Europe. Water Science, Policy, and 
Management: A Global Challenge 215-232. 
Sohn, J. 2007. Development without conflict: The business case for community consent. Washington, DC: World 
Resources Institute, http://pdf.wri.org/development_without_conflict_fpic.pdf  (accessed 6 July 2020) 
Srinualchan, S. 2017. Fish farmers protest pig farm fouling waterways. Bangkok Post. 20 June 2017, 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1271927/fish-farmers-protest-pig-farm-fouling-waterways  
(accessed 4 July 2020) 
Svensson, J. 1999. Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms. The World Bank. 
Tangsupvattana, A. 2011. Political De-development, Corruption and Governance in Thailand. In Kimura, H.; Suharko, 
M.; Javier, A.B. and Tangsupvattana, A. (Eds), Limits of good governance in developing countries, pp. 71-102. 
Jakarta, Indonesia: Gadjah Mada University Press. 
Tetreault, D. and McCulligh, C. 2018. Water grabbing via institutionalised corruption in Zacatecas, Mexico. Water 
Alternatives 11(3): 572-591. 
Tevapitak, K. and Helmsing, A.H.J. 2019. The interaction between local governments and stakeholders in 
environmental management: The case of water pollution by SMEs in Thailand. Journal of Environmental 
Management 247: 840-848, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.06.097  
Thailand Clean Air Network. 2020. Clean air blue paper: Insights on the impact of air pollution and its root causes. 
Bangkok, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LDZzEsOeYKdFK0Pk8f0Sa6PpBWD_tzlx/view  
Thitanuwat, B.; Polprasert, C. and Englande, A.J. 2016. Quantification of phosphorus flows throughout the 
consumption system of Bangkok Metropolis, Thailand. Science of The Total Environment 542: 1106-1116, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2015.09.065  
Transparency International. 2008. Global corruption report 2008: Corruption in the water sector. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wangcharoenrung, C. 2017. Current situation and issues of industrial wastewater management in Thailand. In WEPA 
International Workshop on Industrial Wastewater Management, Jakarta. 
Watcharothai, K. 2018. The studies for guideline protection of public procurement corruption in Thailand. 
International Journal of Crime, Law and Social Issues 5(1): 153-163. 
Zimelis, A. 2020. Corruption research: A need for an integrated approach. International Area Studies Review 23(3): 
288-306. 
 
THIS ARTICLE IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CREATIVE COMMONS ATTRIBUTION-NONCOMMERCIAL-SHAREALIKE 
LICENSE WHICH PERMITS ANY NON COMMERCIAL USE, DISTRIBUTION, AND REPRODUCTION IN ANY MEDIUM, PROVIDED THE ORIGINAL 
AUTHOR(S) AND SOURCE ARE CREDITED. SEE HTTPS://CREATIVECOMMONS.ORG/LICENSES/BY-NC-SA/3.0/FR/DEED.EN  
 
